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UNSCRAMBLING THE COLONIAL EGG
We are accustomed to read in the history books of the expansion 
of Europe into Asia and Africa, of the deeds of the great explorers, 
missionaries and pioneers. What I propose to do in this series 
of talks is to consider the opposite process, the contraction or 
withdrawal of the major European powers from Africa south of 
the Sahara.
Withdrawal in the way which I see it ought not to be seen 
rather emotionally as “ retreat,” but perhaps as “ disengagement." 
There has been little systematic thought given to Europe’s dis­
engagement from Africa; such a process does not have the 
adventure or heroism associated with empire-building.
I think you will agree that this is a vast and complex subject, 
so I have decided to restrict myself to looking at one aspect of 
the problem, namely, the effect which this disengagement or 
withdrawal has had upon the mental outlook of the Great Powers 
concerned, We might, in fact, call this psychological politics.
I have set myself the task of finding out how the various Great 
Powers have adjusted themselves to their new role in the post­
colonial world. Do they feel embittered, frustrated or guilty now 
that their old Empires have largely passed away? Are they richer 
or poorer, happier, or do they long for the faded glory of their 
Imperial past? In trying to answer these questions my main con­
cern will be with Britain, France and Belgium (Holland's main 
interest has been in Asia, in Indonesia), and the Portuguese have 
not in truth “ disengaged" themselves in the sense in which I speak.
Speaking, perhaps, tongue in cheek, the economist, Professor 
J. K. Galbraith (no dismal scientist he), argued the other day that 
Britain has suffered from what he calls the "area fallacy” or 
“ acreage syndrome". The British were possessed of a red-paint 
psyche, I suppose you might call it; the more of the world map 
painted red the better for the world. The French, I suppose, on 
this logic, could be happy only if Africans and Asians grew up as 
model Frenchmen, stamped in the image of Descartes, writing 
French poetry. Galbraith’s point is Disraeli’s point; colonies are 
“ millstones round the neck” of the colonial power.
The analysis, however, overlooks one important consideration, 
namely, the fairly new notion that the richer countries in the
world have a "duty” to assist the developing nations. The idea 
of assistance to economically under-developed countries has 
become a part of every good major power’s budget. It has become 
a subject in itself. In Britain, somewhat characteristically, the first 
step in this direction was made in the depth of a slump and the 
height of a war. The Colonial Development and Welfare Acts 
date from 1929 and 1940; in 1940 Britain spent £5.5 million on 
colonial development. In 1965-66 British Government aid was 
running at over £200 million, half in grants and half in loans. The 
French too have now accepted the principle of economic assist­
ance. In 1959 the French set up the Fonds d 'ln v e s tis s e m e n t p o u r  
i t  D e v e lo p p e m e n t E c o n o m iq u e  et S ocia le and a special fund f o r  Africa, 
the Fonds d 'A id e  et de C o o p e ra tio n . France, like the Soviet Union 
and China, spends 2 per cent, per year; thirty to forty-five 
billion dollars a year are needed; today the total volume of 
international aid is about six billion. Moreover, aid can some­
times be wiped out, as happened, for example, between 1955 and 
1959, when Africa lost twice as much as she received in external 
aid through falls in world price of raw materials. Withdrawal, I 
would suggest, in terms of these vast sums which the developed 
countries are called upon to provide, does not mean economic 
withdrawal; it means no more than the signs and the trappings 
of political sovereignty.
Profitable or not, the Great Powers had little notion of any 
disengagement from Africa until the mid 'fifties. Even during 
World War II the colonies were not generally thought to come 
within the meaning of the Atlantic Charter. Churchill’s notorious 
claim that he had not become His Majesty's first minister in order 
to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire has been 
often referred to, but frequently people lose sight of the fact that 
Mr. Attlee’s Labour Government made no reference to the coming 
independence of the British colonies in its policies, as Sir Seretse 
Khama of Botswana and others might ruefully testify.
As late as 1954 a member of the British Government could 
say in the House of Commons that it had always been understood 
that "certain territories in the Commonwealth could not expect to 
be fully independent ". Yet between 1950 and 1960 ten African 
territories became independent, and then followed 1960, "Africa’s 
Year” , as it was called, in which no fewer than eighteen States, 
mainly in French West Africa, gained independence. Now African 
independent States are no novelty.
One might very reasonably ask why the granting of inde­
pendence was made so recently and so suddenly. There are two 
major reasons and I propose to devote a lecture to each of these; 
the first one might be termed "ethical" and the second might be 
regarded as "political". The first involves a changing climate
of opinion and the second involves pressures of a political nature, 
what the Germans call r e a lp o l i t ik .
If we ask ourselves why initially Europe involved itself in 
Africa we see that the economic factor (search for raw materials 
or for new markets) is highly important. Yet as the European 
powers vacated their colonies, no attempt was made to terminate 
trading links which took many Europeans to Africa in the first 
place. This is not to assert that the economic factor is all-im­
portant; the Bible, the gun and the strings of beads all went 
together unselfconsciously. The “ string of beads” so beloved of 
one school of “ romantic” writers? Giles the cartoonist depicted 
the old colonial surrounded by pictures, trophies, tusks and lions' 
heads. An ardent young G.I., courting the ex-Governor's daughter, 
is seen to ask: “ But surely, Sir, you took it all for a handful of 
beads?”
There is the germ of a point here. The apoplectic expression 
on the Governor's face suggests that string of beads or not, 
economics or not, Empire-building and Empire-destroying was a 
highly emotional affair. Symbols have always meant so much to 
men; flags, badges, regimental colours, national anthems, national 
animals. Decolonisation involved the removal of political symbols 
like the monarchy, the flag of the colonial power, the garden party 
and the invention of new symbols, animals and songs. Apart from 
these externals, little appeared to be changed as the colonial egg 
was unscrambled. Religion, language, custom remained as the 
Governor went. What indeed was handed over to the new rulers 
in so many of these countries? They have been satisfied to 
receive only one thing, the most tangible and indefinable of poli­
tical concoctions, that which we call political sovereignty. Politi­
cal sovereignty, the mystique of independence, was a political 
string of beads. Yet it is the ultimate in political status symbols 
and involves membership of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations. To the political scientist, then, the disengagement pro­
cess is of great interest because it fixes our gaze upon the 
continuing attachment of men to symbols to loyalties, so much 
so that the removal of even a royal figurehead or a functionless 
Governor-General may be regarded as of great significance.
Beneath this intangible process lay another intangible move­
ment, national self-determination, a concept which had developed 
in Europe through the rhetoric of Rousseau and Kant and the 
reality of the French Revolution. With Woodrow Wilson, national 
self-determination became conventional wisdom. National self- 
determination does not necessarily lead to stability. In Latin 
America the latter still eludes politicians one hundred and fifty 
years after the great age of emancipation.
African nationalism appears to be both wider and narrower 
than its European counterpart. In Europe the unitary nation-state 
was characteristic, a Poland or an Italy. African nationalism, on 
the other hand, is frequently tribal and nothing else; sometimes it 
transcends the mere tribe and becomes linked up with various 
“ pan” movements— vague wide cultural affiliations including poetic 
fantasies like existentialism and n e g n tu d e . Take the Gold Coast 
for example. Only in 1901 did it become a single unit, and Nigeria 
not until 1914. On the other hand, the Upper Volta was detached 
from the Ivory Coast in 1919 and dismembered in 1932. Britain 
aimed at making nation-states like Poland or Italy and then depart.
Moreover, African nationalism has not yet finished evolving. 
What colonial powers experienced (and for the large part did 
not like) was e lite  nationalism, that is a nationalism built around 
some powerful westernised African figure, an Nkrumah, a 
Kenyatta, a Leopold Senghor. Out of this emerged mass national­
ism in which the new leaders were forced to justify themselves 
to the masses beneath. Some leaders (helped by British and 
French troops) held off the challenge, as in East Africa in 1964 
and Gabon in 1965. Leaders fell and are falling and the army, 
much to the relief of many people, took over. Whereas the original 
post-colonial leader found his spiritual home in the London School 
of Economics, the new military rulers are graduates of Sandhurst 
and their equivalents. Out of the thirty-eight member States of 
the Organisation of African Unity, the heads of about a dozen 
States are military men.
Despite the process of disengagement of colonies from the 
mother country, then, strong emotional attachments do remain. 
While wishing to break away, the colonials frequently cling to 
colonial values and attitudes in truly remarkable fashion. This 
was suggested as long ago as 1915, when a young Indian in South 
Africa named Gandhi said, “ I discovered that the British Empire 
had certain ideals with which I have fallen in love” . Moreover, 
French elegance is evident in the writings of Senghor or the style 
of a Keita, and sometimes one sees in the wealthy westernised 
Indian a caricature of one of Victoria’s pro-consuls. The West 
African law student moves easily about the Inns of Court in 
London looking the very epitome of the successful barrister.
There are gains and there are losses. Withdrawal of the 
metropolitan power has frequently been a bad thing for the 
ex-colony's political cohesion, governmental stability and legal 
certainty; but at least they must now squarely accept responsi­
bility for their own particular mess. Speaking many years ago 
about the British Empire, Smuts once said, “ Forms and formulas 
may still have to be adjusted, but the real work is done” . He 
could little have realised that the adjustment of forms and for­
mulas would eventually lead to the unscrambling of the colonial 
egg itself.
BRITISH DECOLONISATION: THE ETHICAL PROBLEM
Many centuries ago Aristotle pointed out the close connection 
between political science and ethics. As soon as a so-called 
‘'political" question came to be discussed, there was raised a 
question of its rightness or wrongness.
Dealing with a subject like colonisation or decolonisation, 
it is clear that people instinctively react to these very words, 
sometimes violently for, sometimes violently against. Moral 
evaluations appear to grow out of ideas which in themselves are 
necessarily neither good nor bad. We know what the pioneer 
colonials thought and we are treated ad  n a u sea m  to diatribes by 
the decolonisers on the evils of colonialism. What I intend to do 
in this talk is to describe the ethical problems involved in the 
decolonising process. The ethic or e thos from which colonialism 
developed was an ethos very different from which it has since 
departed. This point is quite fundamental and must be made at 
the outset. There is nothing so sad as to see the worst aspects 
of one age compared with the best of another.
In the great days of expansion the superiority of the West 
was never seen as a mere question of economics. This superiority 
in the nineteenth century was viewed as absolute, quite unself­
consciously without any sense of shame or guilt. Civilisation 
involved a l l the Victorian ethical tenets and the piety of a Living­
stone, the unscrupulousness of the trader and the derring-do of 
the soldier of the Queen went together in one untidy package 
deal. There was no conscious hypocrisy; superiority was under­
stood. What Europe had to offer was seen as unquestionably 
better than anything which it replaced. Macaulay could confidently 
assert, without any trace of jingoism, that "a single shelf of a 
good European library was worth the whole native literature of 
India and Arabia". It was consequently a highminded England 
which in the last century set about the colonising of Africa.
Ruskin said of his country, ". . . she must find colonies as 
fast and as far as she is able” ; Rhodes, putting the matter even 
more bluntly, maintained, "the more of the world we inhabit the 
better it is for the human race” . Economic expansion was an 
ethical expansion and vice versa. "These islands” , said Rhodes, 
"can only support 6 million out of their 36 million. We cannot 
afford to part with one inch of the world’s surface which affords 
a free and open market to the manufactures of our countrymen.”
In 1883 the Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge 
University, Seeley, urged young men to go East and West;
. . it is only necessary to take possession of boundless terri­
tories in Canada, South Africa and Australia where already our 
language is spoken, our religion professed and our laws estab­
lished. If there is pauperism in Wiltshire and Dorsetshire, this 
is but complementary to wealth in Australia. On the one side 
there are men without property; on the other there is property 
waiting for men” .
Kipling taught the English to think of the poetry of Empire. 
From its hallowed centre of Westminster— ‘‘where the Abbey 
makes us we”— to the fringed palm and the snow-capped fort 
at the outer circumference, the Empire was a vast trust for 
humanity. The White Man’s Burden “ constituted the peculiar 
contribution to human progress of the Anglo-Saxon race. Moral 
purpose was evident in all this; something of its fervour might be 
perhaps conveyed to you as you watch the film of K h a r to u m .  
Colonial expansion was the fashion of the age. In the nineties 
no one could resist its compulsion; so much so that in 1893, 
when Gladstone wished to withdraw (the choice of the word is 
deliberate) from Uganda, he was warned by his chief election 
agent that the price for so doing would be his own withdrawal 
from Downing Street.
Victoria was Empress, ruler and mistress over palm and 
pine; the sun never set upon the British Empire. Forty-six years 
after her death her great-grandson, Lord Louis Mountbatten, was 
to complete the transfer of all the paraphernalia of Empire into 
the hands of Indian subjects of the Empire. Born in the sunset 
of that great era, nurtured in its Edwardian afterglow, maturing 
in the harsh new age of total war, Mountbatten was, like so many 
twentieth century Britons, to fight against Victoria’s own German 
kinsfolk and see the King cease to be Emperor of India and 
become, rather prosaically, Head of the Commonwealth.
Writing in 1948, one conservative authority asserted that “ the 
King needs no unwilling subjects” . During the 1950’s colonialism 
became the commonest term of abuse in half the world. The 
Russians used it with deadly skill for their own purposes; it upset 
the consciences of the most anglophile of Americans, and even 
the Germans looked virtuously down their noses at the mention 
of colonies, thanking God that they were not like other people. 
The word was a curse on the lips of millions of Africans and 
Asians.
A decade ago the reputation of British colonialism reached 
rockbottom. One writer, Richard Pares, writing in 1957, asked, 
almost in despair: “ What answer are we to make to the revolt 
of three-quarters of the world against colonialism? Obviously 
we shall not say to the liberated peoples: ‘Come and stamp on 
us for a hundred and fifty years; then we shall be all square and
you will feel better'.” Recent events in Africa, however, have 
helped to rescue Britain’s reputation.
In the nineteenth century Britain had shown a considerable 
gift for timing when they granted responsible government (as 
independence was called in the last century); Canada is a case 
in point. Controversy has raged rather irrelevantly over the 
problem of s ta tu s  rather than timing; is it an Empire, a Common­
wealth, with Dominions, Crown Colonies, Protectorates? All these 
are perhaps false problems. What was important was to know 
or to sense that notice had been given to quit.
The great colonial days were days in which power and 
morality went together; the declining years were years during 
which Britain still had the reins of power, but had lost the absolute 
sense of righteousness. The ethos had changed.
An indication of the departed ethic may be drawn from India, 
the withdrawal from which set in motion many of the decolonising 
tendencies. There appeared to be no solution suitable except a 
complete withdrawal, as Wavell advocated. The mission of Sir 
Stafford Cripps in 1943 foundered on dissension between Hindus 
and Moslems. Local communal clashes were rapidly reaching a 
dangerous stage and augured an all-out conflict between the 
warring communities. King George VI agreed to send Mount­
batten to liquidate British rule in India after three centuries. There 
is no more dramatic example of the renunciation of imperial and 
colonial power ever known. On 22nd March, 1947, just twenty 
years ago, in the traditional pomp and splendour, Britain disen­
gaged herself from India, from rule over 200 million Hindus, 100 
million Moslems and Sikhs, 50 million members of the Depressed 
Classes and 80 million inhabitants of the Princely States. Mount­
batten, the last Viceroy, whose Court was more splendid than that 
of the King in England, told the Indian people: "We are a great 
nation, but we can no longer rule you. . . .”
In the next few years it was to become clearer and clearer 
that the British had "lost the will to govern” . This very phrase 
occurred, for example, in the course of a discussion between 
Mr. Duncan Sandys and Sir Roy Welensky at the time of the 
break-up of the Central African Federation. Did this mean that 
the British were no longer the men that their fathers were, or 
that they had become decadent, soft, molly-coddled in their 
Welfare State, snug and smug in their tight little island? Walter 
Lippman suggested a different interpretation. Writing in the 
W a s h in g to n  P ost of the withdrawal from India, he declared: “ Bri­
tain's finest hour is not in the past. Certainly this performance 
is not the work of a decadent people . . . it is the work of political 
genius requiring the ripest wisdom and the freshest vigour, and
it is done with an elegance and a style that will compel and receive 
an instinctive respect throughout the civilised world.’’
Lippmann’s assessment may perhaps go too far in the other 
direction. More telling arguments were perhaps that Britain could 
not have held India by force. Britain could only have continued 
to rule India by means of a large army of occupation and possibly 
four years' National Service for British young men and a crushing 
financial burden.
Colonial expansion in the 1880’s was for the British an ethical 
categorical imperative; by 1947 colonialism was ethically out of 
court. In Africa it had another ten years to last. All these de­
velopments had an important effect upon Britain itself, upon the 
British national psyche.
There have been two sorts of reactions in Britain. Most 
people, concerned with everyday island problems, the ordinary 
Englishman, for example, devoting his Sunday morning to wash­
ing his Ford Zodiac (?) or Jaguar (?) (a truly Anglican sacrament), 
could not be said to be particularly interested one way or the 
other. The B.B.C. reported an excellent example of parochial 
“ Little-England-ism” during a talk given on television by the then 
Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan. Apparently, when he turned from 
home affairs and asked ‘‘What about abroad?” 100,000 viewers 
switched off their television sets. As the Empire faded away 
there appear to have been few of the popular media to shore it 
up, with one notable exception in the D a ily  E xp re ss  of Lord 
Beaverbrook, for whom Empire was the most sacred of all sacred 
cows.
Even more astonishing perhaps was the point made by 
Richard FJoggart in his examination of the Uses o f  L ite ra c y ui 
which he established the fact that most of the members of the 
British working class were unaware that Britain's colonial empire 
was disappearing or that Britain was anything but a Major Imperial 
Power. It had taken a long time for Rhodes’ message to percolate 
through to the lower segments of British society, and when it did 
the Empire had gone. S ic t r a n s it  g lo r ia  m u n d i.
The second, more informed, reaction to decolonialisation may 
be found also. We note that those who were better informed 
tended either to welcome or to reject the cracking of the colonial 
egg. The passing of Empire was welcomed by Fabians who had 
worked for this demise and condemned by Conservatives who 
had worked against it.
The burning moral purpose of eighty years back is no more; 
the passion to convert, trade and explore which took the British 
to Africa exists no longer. The ethical canons of today are dif­
ferent as we well know. In the unlovely jargon of American
political science, the world is beset by contrary ideologies of 
which we hear neo-colonialism (whatever that might mean) is one 
of the worse. But for the plainer man, the truth is simply that the 
simple burning imperial faith has vanished along with the other 
characteristic impediments of the later Victorian era— gaslight, 
hansom cab and bustle. A u tre  te m p s  A u tre  m o e u rs . 0  te m p o ra , 0  m o re s
BRITISH DECOLONISATION: THE POLITICAL ASPECTS
I have separated the account of British decolonisation into two 
parts: a part which I called ‘‘ethical'’— which I dealt with in the 
last talk— and a part which is this week’s theme, which I call 
“ political” . I am here referring to the hard facts of power politics, 
the immediate response to the pressures of the 'fifties. To use 
the German tag once again, I might say that I’m concerned with 
r e a lp o li t ik . British disengagement from Africa may be seen, in 
part, as a response to the stimulus of anti-colonialist pressures, 
to use the notions of behaviourist psychologists. In the more 
earthy speech of American political journalism, we might say that 
the British "gut reaction” to the intensive African nationalist 
pressures of the mid-fifties was to get up and go. The British 
were ever a race addicted to the acceptance of facts, to changing 
situations, and they have prided themselves in an ability to re­
adjust themselves to the conditions of change.
Politics, it has been said, should act as a midwife, delivering 
the next phase of civilisation without destroying the mother. Bri­
tish civilisation has been passed on, warts and all, and the mother 
herself has been bled, but, generally, unbowed. Like the notorious 
Abbe Sieyes in the French Revolution, Britain has "survived” the 
Imperial era. As far as Africa was concerned, the Imperial age 
was short indeed, a mere eighty years. Yet withdrawal at the end 
of the ’fifties was not a phased-out process. The timing went to 
pieces and the withdrawal became at times, perhaps, an undig­
nified rush. Why, we might ask, the haste? Indeed, prior to 1956, 
estimates as to the length of time that it would take to see the end 
of African colonialism varied from a few years to the best part 
of a century. Having lived in East Africa at the time, I can say 
certainly that European communities were completely unprepared 
for the challenge to their dominant position, yet by 1960 the end 
had come.
One hesitates at attributing the winding up of an Empire to 
one key event, but if I were asked to select one such event I 
should plump for the Suez expedition of 1956. In 1966 a writer 
on the problems of the so-called Third World, Professor J. D. B. 
Miller, said that, “ since the Suez failure of 1956 the idea of actively 
coercing Third World countries seems to have been covertly
dropped by all the major powers, except perhaps China". I he 
Suez invasion of 1956 was a final attempt to solve a colonial 
problem (for that is what the operation may be reduced to) by 
force.
The London O b s e rv e r (clearly left-wing on colonial issues) 
made the point that the danger of the Suez expedition was that 
it appeared to suggest that '‘rich" white men tried to force "poor" 
brown men into certain predetermined courses of action. Many 
people did not agree, and the O b s e rv e r lost many readers at the 
time (including myself) for its pains. When it comes to the crunch 
it takes a very brave man not to say "my country right or wrong."
Much British and French thinking regarding decolonisation 
was hammered out under the stress of Suez. Suez became the 
stage on which was played out the drama of decolonisation. Both 
Britain and France were motivated in their dealings with Egypt by 
considerations that could fairly be described as imperialist. In 
psychological terms, their unconscious reactions to Nasser were 
that they regarded him as a rather unpleasant colonial agitator.
The sequence of events in 1956 is well known. In mid '56 
Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal after Mr. John Foster Dulles, 
the U.S. Secretary of State, had refused to permit the supply of 
capital to build the Aswan Dam. The British and French, together 
with the Israelis, decided, after a number of secret meetings, on 
an invasion of Egypt, many of the details of which have now been 
revealed. Sir Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister, decided 
that this was no time for what he saw as Munich-style appease­
ment. Eden felt that he was, as had happened previously, “ Facing 
the Dictator"; Suez was a repetition of the history of the 'thirties. 
Crushing Nasser became a crusade for him.
Perhaps the British government of the day saw its role as 
that of policeman in the area, despite its failures in Palestine, 
Iraq, Jordan and Egypt itself. The attitude of the French was that 
they had built the canal and the memory of de Lesseps should 
not be soured by the actions of a few Arabs. Lady Eden had said 
that she felt that the Suez Canal flowed through her drawing 
room, but the wives of certain French Cabinet Ministers must have 
felt the flood also.
Overnight, however, the Suez trio of the British, French and 
Israelis became drowned in the chorus of world politics. The 
Americans rejected the war (though severe criticisms have been 
made of Mr. Dulles by Professor Finer), and the pound, which was 
at its healthiest since World War II, took a severe "pounding". 
The Suez crisis was a turning point because the Commonwealth 
had no independent African members before 1956. In 1957 Ghana 
became the first decolonised black African State. I would suggest
that there is a connection, for in 1958, eighteen months after Suez, 
a conference of in d e p e n d e n t African States was held in Accra.
The world audience for colonial problems in 1956 consisted 
mainly of the super-powers, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., but after 
1957 the world audience for the colonial powers increased in 
quantity and volubility as each independent State lent its voice 
to the clamour for faster decolonisation. Indeed, the last English­
man to see Nasser before the Suez conflict erupted informed the 
Egyptian ruler that he could not possibly hold out against Britain 
and France. Nasser replied that he did not intend to, but would 
stand back and wait for world opinion to save him. Nasser had 
understood that anti-colonialism was very much “ in the air” . One 
of the great features of the Suez campaign is the way in which 
Nasser kept his nerve while Eden lost his. Even the Americans 
were puzzled when the British forces withdrew. The methods of 
gun-boat diplomacy were futile by the mid-twentieth century, but 
it had taken about half a colonial war to prove it. Moreover, the 
Arabs had been shown the way to self-respect and had taught 
African countries how to be sure of themselves.
As far as Britain itself was concerned, Suez touched a deep 
and vital national nerve. Suez links the British with India, with 
Disraeli, with the Old Queen herself, and you know what that 
means. One can never quite forget, though one may not like, 
Queen Victoria. About this time the very popular, and deservedly 
so, Goon Show appeared on the B.B.C. Said one Goon to 
another: “ Have a picture postcard of Queen Victoria?” “ No 
thanks” , said the other, “ I'm trying to give them up!” The British 
h a d  to give up Queen Victoria. Suez was the parting of the 
waves for the British. It was certainly the “ parting of the waves” 
for the Conservative Party— traditionally the party of the Empire. 
The party which had gone to war in 1956 behind one leader in 
order to protect the colonial legacy ranged itself behind a leader 
whose banner in 1960 was “wind of change” .
In late 1956 and early 1957 the die was being cast. The 
colonial epoch was losing its letters of credit. The British people 
as a whole were divided, but common patriotism induced them 
to support the Government. The public opinion polls gave the 
Government a small majority throughout. The Labour Opposition 
had a field day, condemning the whole exploit in strong language. 
Gaitskell, the Labour Party leader, advocated a "Law, Not War” 
campaign. A mass rally of 30,000 heard Aneurin Bevan at his 
oratorical polemical best in Trafalgar Square. Strong and highly 
unparliamentary language was used at protest meetings. The 
usually composed Mr. Denis Healey (now Labour Minister of 
Defence) asked one crowd: “What sort of people are you to 
allow a liar and a cheat to be your Prime Minister?”
The answer to this question, I suppose, is that the British did 
not know what sort of people they were, or rather they had not 
the measure of the age into which they were moving. As for the 
Prime Minister, he departed, and his associate Harold Macmillan 
muddled effectively through a very trying time both for his party 
and for the nation. Macmillan's task was to take Britain, and the 
Conservative Party in particular, from a mental condition of im­
perialism 1956 variety to the day in spring, I960, less than four 
years later, when he told the South African Parliament and the 
world that Britain accepted the wind of change. In Britain, on 
the left, there was gloom, not because the Conservatives were in 
a dilemma, but because they had so much support. Bevan summed 
up the feelings of the more perceptive members of the party. 
“ If we don't take care” , he said, “we shall turn the working class 
against us. Of course I am against Eden's crazy attempt to put 
the clock back, but there’s no reason why, in attacking the Tories, 
we should commit ourselves to the view that all United Nations' 
decisions must be accepted and that all recourse to force must 
be opposed as aggression. What makes the Labour Party go 
wrong in foreign affairs” , he continued, “ is that it takes its policies 
from middle-class intellectuals, devoid of antennae and with a 
dreadful habit of falling down and worshipping abstractions. In 
fact, there is only one motto worse than ‘My country right or 
wrong' and that is The United Nations right or wrong’."
Such are the strange ways of politics that the lessons of 
Suez made their impact not upon the Labour Party in Britain, 
but upon the Conservatives. In the months that followed, the 
decision was taken that Britain would have to decolonise. Lan­
caster House saw comings and goings (prison graduates and 
Prime Ministers from places not yet born), discussions, meetings, 
conferences. Constitutions were produced, analysed, dismem­
bered, signed, sealed and delivered to men bearing fly-whips, 
wearing a fez, dressed in coloured bath robes from all corners 
of Africa. The British people saw it all on television, when they 
watched such things, and must have been the first to see an 
Empire written off, as it were, from an arm chair in the drawing 
room.
Some people have argued that the British were deceitful 
dismantlers who destroyed the Empire slowly, “ in the dark and 
by stealth” (to use Sir Roy Welensky's interesting phrase), weep­
ing crocodile tears as they did it. The clue was there for Sir Roy, 
however. In his book 4,000 Days he speaks of the Prime Minis­
ters' Conference in 1957 and says, “ . . . our topics included the 
Middle East (which in the aftermath of Suez bulked very large). 
. . .” “ He noted a growing hostility” “ . . . not only in what was 
coming to be known as the Afro-Asian b lo c  in the United Nations, 
but in Britain itself” .
In fact, Anylo-Egyptian relations improved quite quickly. In 
1959 diplomatic relations were resumed and, as the authoritative 
Survey of the Royal Institute of International Affairs put it, “ At 
the close of 1959 Nasser's r e c o v e r y  f r o m  Suez seemed almost 
complete.” One cannot say this of Britain. Suez became the 
writing on the wall and Mr. Macmillan read the word “ decolonise". 
Great power politics was a thing of the past. Suez was an attempt 
at imperialism on the cheap (Mr. Macmillan as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer set aside £5 million for the venture). Pinch penny 
imperialism was worse, Mr. Macmillan felt, than no imperialism. 
The American roving ambassador reported to Washington, “we 
shall all be fried to a crisp” , as he eyed the hovering Soviets. 
Hence Washington exerted pressure— and the evidence for this 
is overwhelming— and the colonial age was over.
FRENCH DECOLONISATION: DESCENT TO GRANDEUR
It might be worth considering the attitude of the French President, 
General de Gaulle, regarding the place of France outside the 
French Republic. A recent biographer holds that the General 
blamed France's defeat in 1871 at the hands of Bismarck upon 
the fact that so many Frenchmen were embroiled in oversea 
adventures. De Gaulle belongs quite firmly to the “ Metropolitan" 
school which saw French involvement overseas in Madagascar, 
Ton King and Morocco as a tragic distraction. "France", he is 
supposed to have said, “ always looks towards the Vosges. To 
distract the troops from that is surely a betrayal of trust” .
De Gaulle was thankful enough to use French colonies dur­
ing the war, but his gaze has always been directed homeward, 
at Mother France. Perhaps there is, in his devotion to the philo­
sophy of Bergson, a clue to de Gaulle's political thinking. Bergson 
analysed the uneasiness of the changing reality of life. “ It is the 
nature of the intellect", said he, “ to grasp and consider what i s  
constant, fixed and definite; so it tries to avoid what is changing, 
unstable and divergent". On this analysis it is France which is 
eternal and unchanging; colonies are the product of the transitory, 
the ephemeral, the dispensable. Bergson moreover argued that 
man’s mind must acquire intuition, by combining instinct with 
intelligence.
De Gaulle himself showed his intuition, his own special com­
bination of instinct with intelligence, when, in 1960, he perceived 
that the French Community (the GauHist Conception of Empire 
described in the Constitution of the Fifth Republic) did not satisfy 
the needs of the countries which, juridically, formed the Com­
munity. No one else could have carried out decolonisation with 
such spectacular speed and smoothness, skirting carefully around
the legal technicalities ot his own Constitution to accord full 
independence to former colonies.
When de Gaulle came to power he showed himself unin­
terested in the classical dilemma— French Empire, which implied 
authoritarianism, or French Revolution, with its message of liberty, 
equality and fraternity. For him the problem to be faced was 
different in character. He argued that neither the Empire nor the 
universalist principles of the Revolution were important: only 
French self-preservation and self-interest were of account. As 
Algeria appeared to offer no prospects of assisting French self­
needs, de Gaulle decided to end the problem. Within three years 
of his having attained power both the old colonies and the old 
principles had disappeared.
France has fairly faced up to the problems of decolonisation 
as far as Africa is concerned (the French do not appear to be so 
interested any longer in the fate of the Far Eastern Empire). The 
whole of French West Africa is generously assisted by the 
French taxpayers, not perhaps always enthusiastically. The 
economic aftermath of decolonisation has also been fairly faced, 
and French economic aid for Africa amounts to 6 per cent, of 
the Budget. The poverty of the former territories is acute. The 
whole of French West Africa with its population of twenty million 
was less rich than the former Gold Coast (population about seven 
million). The British could never quite understand French interest 
in the deserts of the Sahara. Lord Salisbury said of this interest 
in 1884: “The cock of Gaul loves scratching in the sand.”
In the aftermath of decolonisation the French are paying for 
their sandy colonial deserts. Far from freeing herself from the 
financial burden of the colonies, she finds herself giving aid on 
a far more generous scale to these countries now that they are 
independent. If this aid is to be effective there must be an econo­
mic plan, but to plan you need a single authority, which is of 
course France. So we are back to colonialism again. The more 
a thing changes, the more it remains the same.
It would appear, however, that the French ex-colonies in 
West Africa welcome the close connection between themselves 
and the metropolitan power. Note, for example, what President 
Senghor of Senegal said during a visit to France just after inde­
pendence. “ Educated in your schools, we have become a little 
like you. . . ." He went on, “ France has rediscovered her voca­
tion for liberating, enlightening and helping others. France spends 
most per head of her population on helping underdeveloped 
peoples. Senegal is witness that this help is disinterested. In 
spite of this effort of unprecedented solidarity, it is France that, 
of all the great powers, exercises least pressure on us."
Even after French colonial withdrawal, the economic and 
cultural connection between France and her African territories is 
stronger than ever. Moreover, the individual States can find no 
better guide in drawing up their constitutions than imitating those 
of President de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic. They have a preference 
for the strong presidential type of government, and many con­
stitutions are modelled upon the Fifth Republic itself.
The ex-colonies are all juridically sovereign States, members 
of the United Nations, but all twelve ex-French West African 
colonies have actually signed agreements providing for close 
co-operation with France. The agreements foljow similar lines, 
whether relating to States inside or to those outside the Com­
munity. The States agree to co-operate with France in the areas 
of foreign policy, economic and financial policy and higher educa­
tion. France trains their armies (Upper Volta is an exception 
here), and in some cases (Senegal, Mauritania and Madagascar) 
permits France the right to station her armed forces in their 
territories.
France, for its part, gives most generous financial aid and 
grants preferences to the exports of her former colonies in return 
for preferential treatment accorded French products. Even more 
important, France brought her French colonies into association 
with the Common Market, with its attendant benefits. With pro­
found foresight the French have restricted their personnel in 
Africa to the role of experts and advisers so that the French have 
never been accused of holding on too long to jobs which Africans 
have hoped to get. There is, then, close contact between the 
ex-colonial power and her West African proteges. Withdrawal in 
the French context has not been withdrawal at all, thanks to the 
French talent for attracting, I might say hypnotising, the peoples 
with whom she came into contact.
The grand exception to this rule, however, has been the 
case of Guinea, which rejected the referendum of 1958 bringing 
de Gaulle back to power. Following upon de Gaulle's rejection, 
the new French President decided that if the Guineans wanted 
disengagement they should have it— lock, stock and barrel. With­
in days French civil servants withdrew. Out of 4,000 of these 
civil servants, all but fifteen had gone within three weeks. Cash 
registers were ripped out, the weapons of the police were with­
drawn, and so was the library of the Ministry of Justice. The 
Governor was instructed to remove the furniture from Government 
House and to strip all fittings movable and immovable and ship 
them to France. Telephone wires were removed, fruit trees were 
cut, gardens decimated, walls torn down, obscene curses scrawled 
on buildings and a ship bringing five thousand tons of rice was 
re-routed.
As a result, Toure, already a Marxist, was thrown into the 
hands of the Communist States. As far as Guinea was concerned, 
this was an unprofitable exercise, and in May, 1963, de Gaulle 
agreed to resume technical and financial aid to Guinea, complete 
with a grant of various credit facilities. The umbilical cord between 
France and Guinea, so rudely cut in 1958, had been repaired.
The French language is a bond between the ex-colonies of 
immense importance, so much so that the French territories are 
frequently described as F ra n co p h o n e , which sounds I think like 
a large and antique musical instrument. De Gaulle is very proud 
of the fact that a very large part of Africa is f ra n c o p h o n e . Ever 
since 1960, when almost ail of the former French colonies became 
independent— after the collapse of the 'Community’' idea of 1958 
— de Gaulle has taken special pleasure in receiving in Paris with 
great pomp the presidents of the various new African States. 
Public buildings in Paris are frequently seen to be flying un­
familiar flags (sometimes the wrong way up) of, say, Dahomey, 
Upper Volta or Congo (Brazzaville). They come for money 
(Morocco alone gets $45 million), technicians and teachers. They 
get all three.
Looked at in these terms, perhaps one would be wrong to 
expect drastic change with the granting of independence. France 
was a monarchy for a thousand years; it has been a republic for 
ninety-odd, but it is precious close to being ruled by an Emperor 
today. The Emperor has his Empire, free from Paris protocol and 
bureaucracy, but enslaved to the philosophy of Sartre and the 
grandeur of the General. The paradox is that the World's Number 
One Decoloniser— respected and admired amongst so many of 
the emirs of emergent Africa from the Cameroons to the Congo—  
yet he who has the confidence and respect of his pensioners, 
the ex-colonials.
De Gaulle's aid to underdeveloped Africa has had its critics 
in France itself. M. Raymond Cartier, a journalist in the periodical 
P a r is - M a t c h ,  has been a constant critic whose criticisms have 
found a ready ear in many quarters.
In 1963 a government committee which was set up under 
M. Jeanneney, criticised the deployment of French investment in 
Africa. Too much, it was argued, went into current spending and 
not enough into long-term investments. Even in the case of Algeria, 
it was argued, the French taxpayer was having to support an 
intolerable financial burden, whereas only months before she had 
had to support an intolerable military burden.
The total result of France's effort is that, of all the ex-colonial 
powers, France is the only one which can really claim to be 
''loved''. Tributes to General de Gaulle are almost daily occur­
rences in French Africa. It’s highly significant that, just prior to
the abortive Afro-Asian conference of June, 1965-— which was 
put off because of the coup  d ’e ta t which displaced Ben Bella for 
Boumedienne— it was suggested that only three non-Afro-Asian 
guests of honour might be invited: Castro, Tito and— de Gaulle.
The question therefore arises: have the French really with­
drawn from Africa? The answer appears to be “ no” , or at most 
“ hardly” . The ideals of assimilation remain long after the transfer 
of sovereignty. The States continue to model themselves upon 
France, often to a ludicrous extent. The search for the “ black 
soul” is made in terms of French philosophy. French education, 
literature and modes of thought remain the formative factors in 
fra n c o p h o n e  life.
There is little real deviation from French models. The bacca- 
laureat (matriculation and entry to French university) has become, 
as one Frenchman put it, “ the superior fetish, the most powerful 
of fetishes in modern Africa” . Any idea that France is trying to 
fob the Africans off with something down-graded and inferior is 
resisted ferociously. To be a man of the Ivory Coast or of Chad 
is not necessarily more worthwhile than to be a man of France.
French w ith d ra w a l from Africa may be best summed up in 
the words of President Leon Mba of the Gabon Republic, who 
declared on an official state visit to Paris that “ Gabon is inde­
pendent, but between Gabon and France nothing has changed, 
everything continues as before” .
CONGO: KING LEOPOLD'S LEGACY
Congo! The very word itself tends to evoke a chill reaction in 
many people inside and outside Africa. The name of this be­
nighted country has tended to become the symbol of all that is 
fearful about emergent Africa.
In 1876 King Leopold II tried to suggest that Belgium should 
increase her prestige by annexing a colony— but no one was 
interested. Belgium had herself only fairly recently become an 
independent State and most Belgians could not see the point of 
becoming an imperial power, a ruler of others, as it were, on 
the morrow of her own independence.
King Leopold, whose feelings on this matter weren't in­
fluenced by such niceties, simply annexed the Congo as his 
private kingdom. His regime, which has received a very bad 
Press, as it were, from historians, caused an international uproar, 
and in 1908 the Belgian Government, forced by pressure from 
America and Britain, took over the administration of the territory. 
From 1908 until 1959 the Belgian population neither knew nor 
indeed cared much about the Congo.
Belgium had no tradition of empire as had France and Britain, 
and the Congo was, for most Belgians, merely a sound business 
venture. Development, it was felt, was going along smoothly and 
the public and the politicians were content to leave the manage­
ment of the Congo in the hands of the minister responsible and 
the Governor-General. During the time of the coalition of the 
middle fifties a standard Belgian joke was that once a year the 
Prime Minister would turn to the Minister of the Colonies and 
say, “ How are things with you, Auguste?" to which the Minister 
would reply, “ Going well, Achilie, thanks” . The Belgians more­
over were not an internationally minded power. Created as a 
State only in 1830, they had no long history of international rela­
tions. Brussels had never been a world capital like London or 
Paris. A very sombre, never a swinging, city.
The Congo was, for the Belgians, a place to visit, to work 
in and to take back a few Congolese francs (on a par with the 
Belgian franc). There were 10,000 settlers in the Congo who 
regarded themselves as permanent residents, but apart from 
these (and the 7,000 missionaries), non-Congolese were transient 
and sometimes embarrassed phantoms in the African sun. As 
late as 1959 the Congo was not an issue in Belgian politics. The 
Belgian Governor-General Rychmans, who belonged to one of 
the few “colonial” families, could say: “ I am full of hope. Congo­
lese who have travelled elsewhere in Africa find that all in all 
life at home is best” . Much emphasis has been placed upon the 
Belgian colonial theories as a reason for the Congolese eruption 
of 1960, but it would appear more feasible to point to Belgian lack 
of experience in the art of colonial withdrawal.
Above all, the Belgians did not wish to be saddled with an 
Algeria. On all sides was heard the call “ not to soldier for the 
Congo” as the Belgians considered how best to extricate them­
selves from their most unwelcome dilemma. Only a very few 
years before, in 1956, Professor A. A. J. van Bilsen was howled 
down as he suggested preparing the Congo for independence. 
By 1960, however, the Belgians were prepared to give the Congo­
lese whatever they asked for. One of the most remarkable 
conferences of recent times was the so-called Round Table Con­
ference of January-February, 1960. This gathering sat in a tense 
atmosphere— Lumumba was brought to it from prison— and in 
the course of that month brought about a reversal in Belgian 
policy and, what mattered more, a complete change in the rela­
tions between Belgians and Congolese. In his opening speech 
to the delegates, M. Eyskens, the Prime Minister, made it clear 
that the Belgians were agreed upon "one essential factor— the 
Congo's independence” . The Congolese wanted it at once.
The Belgian conception of disengagement was unsure; they 
thought they could perhaps disengage in the reverse order to
that of Britain and France. Ihey proposed to grant independence 
first and hoped to control the situation thereafter. It was clear, 
says one student of Congolese politics, “ that the promise of 
independence had been won by Belgian weakness rather than by 
Congolese strength, and that this was by far the most risky grant 
of independence yet made in Africa’’.
We know something of the Belgian attitude. Confronted with 
a situation utterly novel to them, they assumed that the transfer 
of power was a political formality. The Union Miniere and Belgian 
economic interests would continue unimpaired. At its A.G.M. on 
25th May, 1960, at Brussels, no hint that anything amiss was found. 
What did the ordinary Congolese villager think that he would 
get? One anthropologist who spent nearly a year in a small 
village in the Kasai just before independence has given us 
dramatic documentation. Independence would mean “ no taxes, 
increase in salary, ownership of an automobile and the ownership 
of a house like those occupied by the Belgians. Furthermore, 
these miracles would appear overnight” . The older Congolese 
feared that their authority would be decreased; the younger 
Congolese merely wanted the names of the American firms which 
would send them rifles. Writing in his diary on 19th April, 1960, 
the anthropologist, Mr. Merriman, concludes, "they visualise 
independence as something only for themselves, not for the 
country as a whole . . .  it is useless and somewhat specious to 
talk of peace in a country which is pretty clearly heading for war; 
what they want is not reassurance and brave talk of peace, but 
guns” .
As if this unpromising picture at the "grass roots" level were 
not disturbing enough, at the upper reaches of Congolese 
authority and thought a similar confusion reigned. Nobody had 
either thought out or indeed was able to give effect to the problem 
of the sharing of power. There was no clear line dividing separa­
tion and federalism even in the minds of those who favoured 
secession. The Katangese, under their highly capable leader 
Moise Tshombe, argued that all natural resources were the pro­
perty of the province; there was talk of some sort of union between 
Katanga copper and Northern Rhodesia, as it was then. Even the 
Western-encouraged secession of Katanga, however, did noth­
ing towards thinking out the long-term problem of sharing power; 
and it is still not clear whether the Congo is a federal State or not.
The outbreak of army mutiny a few days after independence 
was granted was a crucial factor in the Belgian task of peaceful 
disengagement. The mutiny could have been suppressed if both 
Belgian and Congolese authorities had worked together even at 
a relatively late date in the whole Congo episode. Belgium then 
was partly unable, partly unwilling to withdraw; Congo authority,
such as it was, was partly unable and partly unwilling to control 
the fast deteriorating situation . . .  in these circumstances it 
became clear that some outside force must be called in to arbi­
trate. Kasavubu and Lumumba appealed to the United Nations, 
which involved incalculable and interminable machinations and 
the death of the Secretary General of the world body.
Withdrawal on the part of the Belgians led to total and com­
plete collapse because Belgians alone provided the excellent 
services. No Congolese could run these services. The Congo 
provided a very high level of administration, in some respects the 
best in the whole of Africa. Thus African housing in Leopoldville 
and Elizabethville, now Kinshasa and Lumumbashi, was "lavish" 
compared with housing in other places, according to the authori­
tative book on the Congo by Miss Hoskyns. The number of 
children in primary schools was high, although 50 per cent, of 
the intake left after two years, and the level of basic literacy was 
one of the highest in Africa. At the secondary school level the 
picture was very different. There were, in 1959, no Congolese 
secondary school teachers, and by 1960 there were twenty 
Congolese University graduates (from Lovamum University in the 
Congo), two from Elizabethville and four from universities in 
Belgium.
It's a moot point whether it is better to turn out a considerable 
number of university graduates and a proportionately smaller 
primary and secondary output, or whether the whole effort should 
be concentrated upon giving all children a basic education. The 
Belgians chose the latter and, of the total education budget, 65 
per cent, was devoted to primary education and teacher-training.
The tragedy of the Belgian withdrawal from the Congo— and 
this is to be contrasted with the now prolonged, now accelerated 
disengagement of Britain— is that nobody was prepared for it 
either psychologically or materially. The Belgians were unable to 
disengage themselves overnight and they could not envisage the 
consequences of disengagement. Seven years after the inde­
pendence of the Congo they are still heavily involved in the 
Congo's economic life.
For eighty-five years the Congo had been ruled from Brussels. 
Its immense wealth was developed at enormous effort and cost, 
both to Congolese and Belgians. All this could not be dismantled 
overnight without regard to the enormity of what this disengage­
ment meant. A vast territory in the centre of Africa could not 
be shaken off so easily.
One of the most marked features of the early days after 
independence was the lack of co-operation between the new 
Congolese Government and the Belgians. The Belgian news-
paper la  L ib re  B e lg iq u e  appeared, like so many Belgians, to assume 
that while Belgium had withdrawn from the Congo, they could 
in a sense return. "Belgium has recognised the independence 
of the Congo— yes. But not any kind of independence. Not inde­
pendence in anarchy or disorder." Whereas the British and the 
French had some understanding of disengagement, the Belgians 
had not. After all, they were new at the game.
What the Belgians did then was to create an "apparatus"—  
a form of administration which served to hold the great amorphous 
area known as the Congo together. Once this was removed, the 
Congo disintegrated into tribal segments, each producing its own 
party: thus Abako has been a party of the Bakongo people;MNC 
— Kalondji, the party of the BaLuba of Kasai and so on.
In 1925 Dr. du Bois wrote, "The Belgian Congo is still a land 
of silence and ignorance". In 1959 the same thing could be said. 
After 1960 neither o f  these facts was quite true. The Congo was 
not silent and we were being forced to learn something of it 
whether we wanted to or not.
How then did Belgium, compared with the other colonial 
powers, manage her task of colonial withdrawal? Ciearly, Bel­
gium is bottom of the list, France is at the top and Britain sand­
wiched in between. The French withdraw most effectively because 
in a sense they have not withdrawn at all. French culture is still 
the heart of French West Africa. The British gamble with the 
Commonwealth was at best only a partial success because the 
new Commonwealth, in African eyes, still smacked too much of 
the old Empire. Yet the Africans do appear to wish to preserve 
the Commonwealth. The Belgians, however, had the Congo in 
the back of their minds for the most part, and when they were 
forced to think about it they cast it out. On the very day that 
King Baudouin inaugurated independence with the words, “ My 
country and yours will hail this day with joy” , signs of the troubles 
to come were made manifest. Patrice Lumumba, in a speech 
delivered before the King, hurled a torrent of abuse at Belgian 
rule. The Congo had been beaten into submission. This was 
the legacy of Leopold. Within days came collapse, mutiny, in­
discipline. The Belgians were never interested in the u l t i m a t e  
aims of colonial rule. Withdrawal in these circumstances could 
thus only create a vacuum into which poured the cold war, the 
speculators and the United Nations.
THE END OF DECOLONISATION
Is the colonial age really over? I am inclined to be doubtful. Of 
independence I would say, as did the questioner of Lord Tenny­
son: What did they do with the Holy Grail once they found it,
Mr. fennyson?" Those who indeed claim to be tree of the yoke 
of colonialism frequently complain nevertheless that it still exists.
I have previously suggested that colonialism does not end 
merely because one has removed certain very obvious external 
signs of foreign rule; it does not end with the hauling down of 
the flag of the colonial power. If colonialism could be ended in 
this way, then recent political developments in the Congo would 
be inexplicable. The Congolese did not realise their Golden Age 
with the departure of the Belgians, as we know to our— and their 
— cost. The same is true of the Nigerians and the Southern 
Sudanese, the citizens of Dahomey, the Central African Republic, 
Togo, Ghana et a l. Indeed, they may with the long eye of history 
look back o n e  day, not in anger, but with reflection. The colonial 
epoch may, in time, be looked upon as a seed-bed time rather 
than as an era of infertility.
What I have in mind may be illustrated by reference to the 
ceremony when Queen Elizabeth, as Queen of Canada, and Mr. 
Richard Nixon, then Vice-President of the U.S.A., together 
inaugurated the St. Lawrence Waterway. In his speech, which 
I followed on television, Mr. Nixon said that the British had given 
two unspeakably precious things to North America— the English 
language and the Common Law. He spoke not of the Boston 
Tea Party, nor of the war of 1812, nor of strained relations between 
Britain and the United States in 1956 at the time of Suez; he spoke 
of the positive legacy of English colonialism.
Only in the most severely technical sense are nations ever 
independent: no nation is an economic and cultural island. The 
notion of independence is unutterably complex. Even the most 
perceptive of political scientists can be quite astonishingly out 
of tune with the sounds of the age. In 1951 one of the most 
distinguished of colonial scholars, Dame Marjery Perham, said: 
“ It is not a very bold speculation to believe that they (the British 
territories in Africa) may become fully self-governing nation- 
States by the end of the century” . Ten years later few remained 
which were not fully responsible for their own political destinies. 
Most of these territories are not, however, what we in the West 
should recognise as nation-States. States have been created, 
but not nations. Their most evident characteristic is poverty, but 
in this case politics has led economics. What does impress the 
observer is the continuing dependence, in real terms, upon the 
former colonial power. The best example is that of the f ra n c o ­
p h o n e  States of French West Africa, whose dependence upon 
France, economically, culturally (in a very special sense) and 
militarily, is as great as ever. Even in the case of the Congo, the 
attempt to break the links with the former colonial power is a 
long-continuing and clearly bitter process.
What has changed, of course, is the fact that the ex-colony 
now takes its own sovereign decisions. Every new State likes 
to feel that it does have this power to make decisions, even if 
the decision-making power is in the hands of an e lite . Sensitivi­
ties on this score are very great, as the whole Congo operation 
has shown. “Touchiness'' has been very much a part of the 
whole unhappy Congo saga, from the moment in 1960 when 
Lumumba appeared on the scene to the expropriation of the 
copper resources of the Union Miniere in early 1967. The whole 
decolonisation movement therefore appears to be little more than 
a change of emphasis, hardly even a change of direction over 
the past decade. Set in this way, the claims of some African 
apologists do appear grandiose, to put it mildly. Leopold Senghor, 
for example, asked: “ For what should our final aim be but to 
create the civilisation of the universal for which all men and all 
continents must strive, otherwise it will not come into existence?" 
We must discount much of this as good old-fashioned French 
universalist rhetoric.
Everybody claims to be speaking for truth, justice and civilisa­
tion, but it doesn't require a Socrates to see that much of this is 
special pleading. The colonialists were neither ogres nor saints, 
neither real nor paper tigers. The emancipated powers are not 
avenging angels, and those who have been claiming such status 
have been rudely disabused by their own peoples. We’ve seen 
the reduction of a Redeemer, the kicking out of a Kabaka, the 
axing of an abbe and the booting of a Ben.
Certainly the more one considers the matter, the more clear 
it becomes that it is wrong to see a simple dichotomy between 
pre-colonial and post-colonial phases in recent African politics. 
The fundamental change may come about in a territory's develop­
ment either before or after the single act of colonial renunciation. 
Thus in the case of Algeria, for example, the advent of de Gaulle 
to power was decisive. Had the General not returned to power 
in 1958 the subsequent pattern of an independent French Africa 
would have been entirely different.
African development neither began nor ended with the lower­
ing of the Union Jack or the Tricolor. As far as Africans themselves 
are concerned, there have been two distinct phases in the last 
fifteen years during which the number of independent States has 
grown from three to thirty-eight. Firstly, in the honeymoon of 
independence— in some cases a very brief ecstasy— came the 
sudden emergence of the one-party State, but the fact remains 
that its main deficiency has lain in its inability to provide for 
peaceful changes in the personnel of government. The danger 
point came, and has yet to come in many cases, when party rifts 
developed and the leadership was challenged. In both Ghana 
and Uganda cleverly organised plots were secretly hatched, and
in the former case the Head of State was most ingeniously dis­
posed of in his absence.
The second phase has involved military rule, a phenomenon 
long common to Latin America and now all too evident in modern 
Africa. The Mobutus, the Boumediennes, the Gowans, the 
Ankrahs, are the new men of Africa. Seeing the signs, men like 
Nyerere and Sekou Toure, though “ mere” politicians, have 
attempted to come to terms with the problems of the one-party 
State by allowing a greater degree of flexibility within the party 
itself.
Nobody could have foreseen these developments at the 
moment when the trappings of colonial rule were removed. The 
British fondly hoped that the colonies would adopt the West­
minster model, but this expectation was hardly fulfilled. The 
concept of a clear-cut division between Government and Oppo­
sition, with its gentlemanly assumptions about what is and is not 
parliamentary, never materialised. Such notions of government 
are largely out of place in the torrid air of tropical Africa. Indeed, 
even in Britain itself the House of Commons, in Mr. Crossman’s 
words, has “ surrendered most of its effective powers to the 
Executive and has become a passive forum in which the struggle 
was fought between the modern usurpers of parliamentary power, 
the great political machines” . In other words, the assumptions 
made even by the expatriate British about their own constitution 
were wrong. Small wonder, then, that a nineteenth century con­
ception of parliamentary government would not fit present-day 
Africa.
It has not nevertheless been easy for Africans to claim that 
colonialism has been banished from their States. There are two 
points which might be worth considering in this connection. 
First must be mentioned the question of poverty. Because Africa 
is poor it is consequently open to outside influences, unless, in 
a fit of foolish exasperation, foreign assets are nationalised, a la 
Nyerere. In Europe and America political power has been most 
commonly based on economic power, so that in order to influence 
the former one had to influence the latter. In Africa political 
power has not grown out of wealth which, for the most part, has 
been in foreign hands— banks, insurance, minerals and all sorts 
of technical equipment and technicians. For this reason some 
of the freedom of action of the newly-independent governments 
has been inhibited.
A second interesting development was made clear to me 
recently when I was speaking to a consul of the United States 
of America. He told me that he wanted an assistant to tour the 
territory to see people and understand what was going on. 1
immediately thought of the old District Commissioner on safari, 
a type I had known in East Africa in the days of British colonial 
rule. In truth, the new approaches were not fundamentally dif­
ferent from the old and the new man was being forced to go back 
to the time-honoured method of the colonial safari. Once again 
is suggested the French saying: P lu s  ca ch a n g e , p lu s  c 'e s t la  m em e  
chose-
Hence, then, it is clear that the removal of political control 
from outside is only half the story. Both the poverty of the de­
veloping nations as well as their inability to create new s o c ia l 
institutions have been a handicap to the development of some­
thing really new. The Roman Empire, we might recall, provided 
law, language, roads and government, in a word, e x p e rtis e , for 
their colonies; the same might be said of the British and French 
in their colonies. Perhaps in a thousand years people in Africa 
might be happy to announce their debt to the now reviled colonial 
powers, just as nations now compete to be regarded as inheritors 
of the mantle of Rome.
All developments, however, have hit the resident European 
in Africa. Algeria is a case in point. Because of the general 
insecurity there in 1962, it was decided to evacuate the women 
and the children as a purely temporary measure. Gradually, how­
ever, most of the men decided to leave. Rather than die for 
French Algeria, most of them simply decided in the end to join 
their families in France. By May, 1962, Europeans were leaving 
Algeria at the rate of 10,000 a day. One-third of the total of 
Europeans had left by the end of June, 1962. The age of the 
“colon” was over. The Algerian case is one to ponder; it’s an 
interesting example of how a non-African group reacts under the 
stress of the decolonisation process. Algerian Frenchmen, so we 
see, decided to “ chercher la femme” .
I have been impressed, in this survey of colonial withdrawal, 
by the fact that each nation has its own way of doing things. The 
French have certainly been the most successful decolonisers—  
which may afford them some consolation for their setbacks at the 
hands of the British in the 1880’s— the Belgians have been the 
worst decolonisers, and the British have had mixed fortunes. 
Perhaps all this reflects what philosophers might recognise as 
British empiricism— the British way of doing things by muddling 
through-— Belgian Platonism— building a class of elite Africans—  
and French Cartesianism— colonialisation by definition from Paris. 
Such diversity may, however, have a unity. The unity is the 
vitality and inventive fertility of Europe. With the colonial age at 
least nominally over, it is the E.E.C. Common Market which, as 
the most recent political device, currently absorbs the attention 
of the ex-colonial powers. The old colonies are once again look­
ing to Europe and eagerly accept associate membership of the 
E.E.C. The doughty old empire builder no doubt would not be 
too displeased with this, for if withdrawal was necessary it is 
not perhaps without some historic irony that so many States 
should seek a voluntary link with old mother Europe.
